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Introduction 
Attorney Timothy Muir served as inside general counsel, and later 
outside counsel, for Scott Tucker’s payday loan business.1 Tucker’s  
†  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of 
Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to Cassandra Burke Robertson and the 
editors of the Case Western Law Review for the invitation to participate 
in this Symposium. I also want to thank University of Tennessee College 
of Law alumna Hayley Jensen who first introduced me to Timothy Muir 
in the research paper that she submitted for my Behavioral Legal Ethics 
class, titled: In-House Ethical Dangers: The Perilous Interplay of 
Professional Duties & Client Loyalties (on file with the author). 
1. James Dornbrook, Still Maintaining Innocence, Payday Lender Lawyer 
Muir Faces Reckoning, K.C. Bus. J. (May 11, 2018, 5:01 AM), https:// 
www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2018/05/11/payday-lender-tim-muir- 
prison-scott-tucker.html [https://perma.cc/AW2E-JEF4] (describing Muir’s 
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payday loan enterprise, which did business under various names,2 
charged customers illegal interest rates of 600 percent and higher.3 
Loans were set up to automatically renew—a fact that was 
misrepresented in the required Truth in Lending Act (TILA) forms.4 
The loan payment plans resulted in a $300 loan costing a consumer 
$975, though the TILA forms represented it would cost $390.5 
In an effort to escape prosecution and consumer class actions, Muir 
and Tucker entered transactions with Indian tribes to create the 
appearance that the tribes owned and operated the payday loan 
business.6 The government described Muir as “the architect” of these 
transactions.7 The goal was that the payday loan business would avoid 
liability because the tribes, as sovereigns, would not be subject to state 
civil and criminal usury laws.8 In reality, the tribes would play no actual 
ownership role; they were well-paid for entering the “ownership” 
agreement and keeping a company computer on the reservation.9 
 
role with the payday loan business as general counsel for about six months 
and then outside counsel). The court described Muir’s role as the 
company’s “general counsel since 2006.” United States v. Tucker, No. 16-
CR-91(PKC), 2017 WL 3610587, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017). 
2. Tucker, 2017 WL 3610587, at *1 (explaining that numerous payday loan 
businesses—with names that included Ameriloan, One Click Cash, and 
others—were owned and operated by Tucker, and shared common 
employees, computer systems, and office infrastructure as part of AMG 
Services, Inc.). 
3. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1, United States v. Tucker, 
No. 16-CR-91(PKC), 2017 WL 3610587 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2017) 
[hereinafter Sentencing Memorandum]. 
4. Id. at 3. 
5. Id. at 2–3. 
6. Dornbrook, supra note 1; Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
7. Tucker, 2017 WL 3610587, at *2. 
8. In their criminal trial, Muir and Tucker argued that prosecution had failed 
to state an offense for the collection of an unlawful debt because the debts 
were lawful in that their interest rates were set by “federally recognized 
Indian tribes, which have sovereign powers that can be abrogated only 
through direction Congressional action.” Id. at *1. The treasurer for the 
Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas testified that the purpose of the business 
relationship between the tribe and the payday loan business was “to get 
around the activity of the states establishing more regulations to deal with 
the payday loan-type businesses.” Dornbrook, supra note 1. 
9. Dornbrook, supra note 1 (explaining testimony from the Kickapoo Tribe’s 
treasurer that the tribe was guaranteed $20,000 per month plus a 
percentage of the proceeds above $2 million in lending per month, the 
tribe was the “owner” but did not manage or have any financial 
obligations to the business, and the tribe’s only obligation was to keep a 
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Tucker and Muir misrepresented the tribes’ interest in the business 
both in court filings and in interactions with customers.10 To keep up 
the charade that the tribes actually owned and operated the business, 
Tucker and Muir went to elaborate lengths to create a fake record.11 
For example, payday loan employees working in company offices in 
Overland Park, Kansas were told to lie about where the company was 
located and were even given weather reports for the places where the 
tribes were located in case the weather came up during small talk on 
the phone with customers.12 
Ultimately, their plan was unsuccessful. The Federal Trade 
Commission obtained its largest civil court judgment to date—$1.3 
billion—against Scott Tucker and AMG Services, Inc.13 Tucker and 
attorney Timothy Muir were charged with and convicted of conspiracy 
to collect unlawful debts, collection of unlawful debts, wire fraud, 
money laundering, and Truth in Lending Act (TILA) violations—all 
related to collection of usurious interest on payday loans.14 Attorney 
Timothy Muir was sentenced to seven years in prison,15 while Scott 
Tucker was sentenced to sixteen years and eight months.16 As this 
Article goes to press in 2019, both Muir and Tucker have appealed their 
convictions. Their cases are pending before the Second Circuit.17 
The field of behavioral legal ethics can provide insight into the 
thinking behind the advice that corporate attorneys like Muir provide 
or fail to provide their corporate clients.18 Traditionally, legal ethics 
 
company computer (that generated financial reports) in the tribe’s 
attorney’s office on the reservation). 
10. Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 3, at 4. 
11. Id. at 3–4. 
12. Dornbrook, supra note 1. 
13. Lesley Fair, Record $1.3 Billion Ruling Against Scott Tucker and Others 
Behind AMG Payday Lending, Fed. Trade Commission: Bus. Blog 
(Oct. 4, 2016, 11:19 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business- 
blog/2016/10/record-13-billion-ruling-against-scott-tucker-others-behind 
[https://perma.cc/5PBE-MWHH]. 
14. Dornbrook, supra note 1; Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1 
(stating that Tucker and Muir were convicted of fourteen counts arising 
from their illegal payday lending scheme). 
15. Dornbrook, supra note 1. 
16. Id. 
17. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, United States v. Tucker, No. 18-1802-
CR, 2018 WL 3970222 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2018). 
18. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 
Ariz. St. L.J. 1107, 1111 (2013) (asserting that many of lawyers’ ethical 
lapses “result from a combination of situational pressures and all too 
human modes of thinking”). 
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education has focused on the law governing lawyers.19 Professional 
responsibility courses and required attorney ethics continuing legal 
education classes deal primarily with professional conduct rules and the 
law of professional liability.20 The thinking behind this educational 
approach is that if lawyers know the law, they will act consistent with 
their ethical and legal obligations.21 
Behavioral legal ethics adds the perspective of behavioral science to 
the study of legal ethics.22 Behavioral science research explains that 
biases, heuristics, and situational factors can have a powerful influence 
on ethical decision-making that operates outside of a person’s conscious 
awareness.23 Thus, behavioral legal ethics provides a new lens through 
which to view and understand attorney decision-making. 
This Article draws on legal ethics and behavioral science to explain 
what the corporate advisor should do, as well as what we have reason 
to believe he may do, when faced with a corporate client’s misguided—
but potentially lucrative—scheme. Part I starts with the corporate 
lawyer’s consciously held conceptions and misconceptions about duty 
owed to her corporate client when company executives propose a plan 
that will create substantial liability for the company—when and if it is 
caught. This Part focuses on the legal ethics piece, without the 
behavioral science perspective, and discusses not only what the lawyer 
should know but what many falsely believe about their duty. 
Then, Part II turns to behavioral science and highlights some of the 
key factors that corporate attorneys are unconsciously influenced by as 
they try to decide how (or if) to address client conduct that may 
 
19. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in Legal Education, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 
43, 44–45 (2009). 
20. Id. at 50.  
21. See generally Tigran W. Eldred, Insights from Psychology: Teaching 
Behavioral Legal Ethics as a Core Element of Professional Responsibility, 
2016 Mich. St. L. Rev. 757, 758–59 (2016) (discussing the effectiveness 
of teaching behavioral legal ethics). 
22. Id. at 759 (explaining that the central idea of behavioral legal ethics is 
that “unethical conduct is frequently the product of psychological factors 
that occur largely outside of the conscious awareness of the decision-
maker. The result is that well-intentioned lawyers will often be unaware 
of how their behavior diverges from their own conceptions of themselves 
as ethical and honest people.”). 
23. See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People 
Are Divided by Politics and Religion 70–71 (2012); Jeff Kaplan & 
Azish Filabi, Head to Head: A Conversation on Behavioral Science and 
Ethics, EthicalSystems.org (2017), https://www.ethicalsystems.org/sites/ 
default/files/files/HeadtoHead_PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MAH-BAJ2] 
(explaining that behavioral ethicists study the “situations, mindsets and 
influences that impact everyday decisions and actions, as well as the 
psychological processes that are likely to encourage unethical behaviors”). 
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amount to a crime or fraud. This discussion moves from attorney self-
interest, to obedience and conformity pressure, and concludes with 
partisan bias. While numerous other biases, heuristics, and situational 
factors can subtly impact any person’s decision-making,24 these are 
some of the most salient influences for the corporate advisor. Both the 
consciously held beliefs and unrecognized influences can combine to lead 
a well-meaning corporate attorney astray. Research reveals that many 
will fail to advise against corporate misconduct, and some will even 
become enthusiastic participants in that misconduct. 
It is against this backdrop that Part III considers which 
interventions could lessen the risk of corporate attorneys providing poor 
advice to company agents on the brink of liability-creating conduct. 
Again, drawing on legal ethics and behavioral science, this discussion 
suggests the pressure points—from priming to education—that are most 
likely to result in positive changes in attorney advice. The Article 
concludes with thoughts on what corporate attorneys can learn from 
the Muir case and behavioral legal ethics in order to provide better 
advice to their corporate clients. 
I. Consciously Held Conceptions and Misconceptions of 
a Lawyer’s Duty When Advising a Corporate Client 
About Its (Possibly) Fraudulent or Criminal Plans 
An attorney advising a client about planned future conduct has the 
legal obligation to help a client understand the prospect of legal liability 
arising from that conduct. As a fiduciary, an attorney’s duty of care 
obligates the attorney to provide the advice that a competent lawyer 
would provide under the circumstances.25 The lawyer’s legal duties as 
an advisor are also embodied in professional conduct rules. These rules 
remind attorneys of the obligation to provide candid advice and to 
exercise independent professional judgment.26 The rules further explain 
that it is the lawyer’s obligation to advise against conduct that is 
criminal or fraudulent.27 The attorney’s role is to help the client 
 
24. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 18; Eldred, supra note 21. 
25. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52 (Am. 
Law Inst. 2000) (describing the lawyer’s standard of care—to “exercise 
the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar 
circumstances”—for purposes of liability for professional negligence and 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
26. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 2.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017). 
27. Id. r. 1.2(d) (prohibiting a lawyer counseling a client to engage in or 
assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct); id. r. 1.2 cmt. 11 
(noting that a lawyer also cannot counsel or assist in client’s breach of 
fiduciary duty when client is a fiduciary); Restatement (Third) of the 
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understand the civil and criminal liability that will be incurred if and 
when the conduct is detected—the lawyer should not weigh the 
possibility of non-detection or profitability of misconduct.28 
Providing a client with information about the risk of liability allows 
the client to make an informed decision about future conduct.29 
Conventional wisdom is that, in most cases, the client will follow the 
lawyer’s advice and thereby avoid liability.30 But regardless of how the 
client decides to proceed, the lawyer is legally and ethically prohibited 
from facilitating a client’s criminal or fraudulent conduct. The law of 
attorney liability provides that an attorney can be held criminally liable 
for participation in a client crime31 and civilly liable for participating in 
client fraud and client breach of fiduciary duty.32 Moreover, attorney 
professional conduct rules require that an attorney withdraw from a 
representation rather than participate in a crime or fraud,33 inform the 
client that the lawyer cannot participate in criminal and fraudulent 
 
Law Governing Lawyers § 94(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (also noting 
that a lawyer should not advise a client to violate a court order). 
28. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 94 cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (explaining that a lawyer should not 
counsel a client about the “degree of risk that a lawyer violation will be 
detected or prosecuted”). 
29. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.4 cmt. 5 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017) 
(explaining that adequate communication is necessary for the client to 
participate in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation 
and that the adequacy of communication depends upon the kind of advice 
being provided). 
30. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (explaining that 
the purpose of protecting privileged communications “is to encourage full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice”). 
31. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 8 (Am. 
Law Inst. 2000) (describing lawyer liability for criminal offenses 
committed in the course of a client representation). 
32. Id. §§ 51, 56–57 (describing circumstances when attorneys have civil 
liability to third parties). See, e.g., Thornwood Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 
799 N.E.2d 756, 768-69 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003) (allowing client’s 
business partner’s claim of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty 
to proceed against client’s lawyer). 
33. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.16(a)(1) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017) 
(requiring an attorney to withdraw when the representation will result in 
violation of law or professional conduct rules). 
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conduct,34 and take steps to ensure that the lawyer’s services are not 
used to facilitate a fraud.35 
When the client is an organization (rather than a natural person), 
the lawyer-advisor is obligated to protect the client from itself (i.e., take 
steps to thwart the client’s plan to engage in conduct that will create 
liability for the client). While a lawyer should try to dissuade a natural 
person from liability-creating conduct (and has tools at her disposal 
that may help convince the client),36 the client is free to make a bad 
choice.37 That is not the case for a lawyer’s corporate (or other 
organizational) client.38 The lawyer’s duties of competence and loyalty 
are owed to the corporation and not to the agents who speak on its 
behalf.39 Thus, when those agents plan to engage in criminal or 
fraudulent conduct that will create liability for or to the organization, 
the lawyer should not defer to those agents and should instead take 
steps to protect the corporation from liability.40 Those steps include 
taking the matter to higher authorities in the organization41 and even 
 
34. Id. r. 1.4(a)(5) (requiring attorney to consult with client about limits on 
the lawyer’s conduct when client expects assistance prohibited by 
professional conduct rules or other law). 
35. Id. r. 4.1 (prohibiting lawyer making a false statement of material fact to 
third person or failing to disclose a material fact when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting in a crime or fraud except as prohibit by the 
confidentiality rule); see also id. r. 1.2, cmt. 10 (describing a lawyer’s 
duties to avoid participating in a crime or fraud); id. r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) 
(permitting disclosure of client confidences to avoid assisting in or to 
mitigate the damage of a client crime or fraud in which the lawyer 
assisted). 
36. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. For example, if the lawyer 
tells the client that the lawyer will withdraw from the representation and 
will disclose the fraud to a third party so that the lawyer can avoid being 
implicated in the fraud, the client may be persuaded to avoid the 
fraudulent conduct. Id. 
37. Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy: 
Rethinking the Attorney Advisor’s Touchstone, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
251, 269 (2011) (explaining that client autonomy may justify allowing a 
client that is a natural person to make a “self-destructive, liability-
creating decision”). 
38. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(b)-(c), cmt. 3 (Am. Bar 
Ass’n 2017). 
39. Id. r. 1.13(b). 
40. Id. r. 1.13, cmt. 3 (explaining that lawyers ordinarily must accept 
company agent’s decisions, but not when they engage in conduct that 
violates an obligation owed to the organization or engages in a legal 
violation that may be imputed to the organization). 
41. Id. r. 1.13(b). 
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going outside of the organization when doing so will protect the 
corporation from liability.42 
A common misconception of the corporate advisor’s role is that he 
should be a zealous advocate of any plan that is arguably within the 
bounds of the law.43 This is the attorney advisor’s “zealous advocacy 
misconception.” The origin of this misconception undoubtedly is the 
ubiquitous description of lawyer as zealous advocate that can be found 
in pop culture,44 the writings of legal ethics scholars,45 and the preamble 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.46 This is not to say that 
lawyers should never be zealous advocates. In fact, the conception of 
lawyer as zealous advocate frequently aligns with a lawyer’s fiduciary 
and ethical duty to a client—such as the courtroom advocate making a 
persuasive argument to the jury.47 That is why the phrase is found in 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the writings of legal ethics 
scholars. It can be an appropriate lawyer mantra—but not always. 
There is a mismatch between zealous-advocacy-within-the-bounds-
of-the-law and the duty of a corporate lawyer advising about possibly 
fraudulent or criminal conduct. Lawyers advising clients about future 
conduct fail their clients—and fail to fulfill their legal and ethical 
obligations to their clients—if they take this simplistic zealous advocate 
 
42. Id. r. 1.13(c); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i), (iii). This is often referred to as 
“loyal disclosure” because the disclosure is in the interest of the 
organizational client. See Paula Schaefer, Protecting a Business Entity 
Client from Itself Through Loyal Disclosure, 118 Yale L.J. Pocket 
Part 152, 152 (2009). 
43. Schaefer, supra note 37, at 252 (quoting corporate attorney Joseph Collins 
during his criminal trial as testifying: “I have a duty to represent my 
client zealously”); Id. 256–57 (providing evidence that many non-litigators 
conceive of their role as zealous advocate). 
44. From the movie Cape Fear: 
Sam Bowden: “A lawyer should represent his client . . . .” 
Max Cady: “Should ZEALOUSLY represent his client within the 
bounds of the law.” 
 Cape Fear (Universal Pictures 1991); A Contrarian List: Not the 
Greatest Legal Movie Lines of All Time, Irreverent Law. (Feb. 21, 
2012), https://lawmrh.wordpress.com/2012/02/24/a-contrarian-list-not-the-
greatest-legal-movie-lines-of-all-time/ [https://perma.cc/M98Q-YFKM]. 
45. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale 
L.J. 1239, 1243 (1991) (describing zealous advocacy as the narrative that 
conveys the ideal of the American legal profession). 
46. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl ¶¶ 8, 9 (Am. Bar Ass’n 
2017). 
47. Schaefer, supra note 37, at 262–63 (explaining why zealous advocacy in a 
courtroom is consistent with an attorney’s duty to a client and why it is 
not in the advising context). 
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view of their role. A zealous advocate of any client scheme that is 
arguably within the bounds of law will fail to provide the advice a client 
needs.48 A client cannot make an informed choice about how to avoid 
liability if the lawyer-advisor is advocating for the scheme, rather than 
advising about the risk of liability for the planned course of conduct.49 
For a corporate client whose agents might be interested in the short 
term gains of fraudulent conduct, the attorney’s obligation to advise 
(rather than to zealously advocate) is critical to the client’s interests.50 
It is important to note an important distinction here. Partisan bias 
can make it difficult for any lawyer—whether a litigator or an advisor—
to objectively judge “the bounds of the law” or the “prospect of legal 
liability.”51 Partisan bias will be discussed later in this Article.52 The 
zealous advocacy misconception described here is a different problem 
and unique to the attorney-advisor.53 A belief or mindset that it is the 
legal advisor’s proper role to zealously pursue (rather than advise 
against) the client’s stated goals unless those goals are clearly illegal is  
48. Id. at 258–64 (describing how zealous encouragement of the client’s 
plans—so long as they are within the technical bounds of the law—does 
not serve the client’s interests). 
49. Id. at 263 (explaining that if a lawyer zealously advocates for a client’s 
agenda, the client may not understand that the plan leaves him vulnerable 
to liability). 
50. Id. at 269 (“The entity client, more than any other client, needs a legal 
advisor to make judgments about what conduct may create legal liability 
and to protect it from such decisions.”). 
51. Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 Ind. L.J. 
1639, 1643–44 (2015) (calling into question the assumption of the 
dominant theory of legal ethics that lawyers are capable of simultaneously 
acting as partisans and objectively determining “the line between 
permissible and impermissible behavior”). 
52. See infra Part II.D. 
53. Some scholars disagree with this view. They would say that all attorneys 
can and should be zealous advocates within the bounds of the law, and 
the problem is not with zeal but that some lawyers have difficulty judging 
“the bounds of the law.” Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 1165, 1172 (2006) (arguing that zeal is not the culprit when 
attorneys take actions that harm their own clients); W. William Hodes, 
We Need More Zealousness, Not Less—But Within the Bounds of the 
Law, Res Gestae, Mar. 2001, at 46. But this contrary view misses two 
key points. First, an attorney advising about possibly fraudulent or 
possibly criminal conduct will be unlikely to advise against the conduct if 
he views his role as being a zealous advocate of anything that is arguably 
within the bounds of the law. This means that in the absence of a black 
and white violation of law—which is seldom the case in the corporate 
world—the corporate advisor will advocate what he should advise against. 
Second, why should the corporate advisor be advocating, zealously or 
otherwise? In order for a client to make an informed decision about a 
course of conduct, the client needs advice and not advocacy. 
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a misconception of the lawyer-advisor’s legal and ethical duty. When 
this twisted conception of duty is combined with some or all of the 
behavioral factors discussed in the next Part, it is easy to understand 
why lawyer-advisors sometimes facilitate corporate client misconduct. 
II. Behavioral Legal Ethics Explanations for Why 
Attorneys May Not Advise Against Corporate 
Client Crime and Fraud 
A corporate attorney’s conscious understanding of his legal and 
ethical obligations is only part of the story.54 There are other factors—
often working outside of the attorney’s conscious awareness—that 
influence the advice the attorney provides when a corporate client 
proposes arguably fraudulent or possibly criminal conduct. Drawing on 
behavioral science research, this Part explores some of the factors that 
may influence a corporate lawyer to provide bad advice to a client. 
A. The Role of Attorney Self-Interest 
In Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for 
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, Tigran Eldred demonstrates 
that criminal defense lawyers are unaware that their own self-interest 
heavily influences the poor representation they provide their indigent 
clients.55 These lawyers have a blind spot to perceiving that a conflict 
of interest—between their interests and that of their clients—is causing 
their performance to come up short.56 While it may seem that indigent 
criminal defense lawyers and corporate advisors would have little in 
common, that is not the case. Eldred’s research is revealing of how self-
interest can influence any lawyer to unwittingly provide incompetent 
representation to a client when the client’s interest is misaligned with 
that of the lawyer. 
Eldred explains the importance of a criminal defense lawyer 
conducting an investigation of the underlying facts,57 and describes how 
 
54. In the 2011 article in which I argued that zealous advocacy by legal 
advisors was not in the corporate client’s interest, I stated: “Because many 
factors contribute to how lawyers represent their business clients, I 
acknowledge that a shift in thinking away from zealous advocacy is not a 
panacea.” Schaefer, supra note 37, at 282. In the present Article, I attempt 
to address some of those other factors. 
55. Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving 
Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 333, 339 (2012) (explaining that attorneys “fail to perceive 
themselves as unethical in situations in which their own self-interest 
conflits with duties owed to others”). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 340–44. 
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the failure to investigate can have disastrous consequences for clients.58 
Yet, the indigent criminal defense lawyer has little or no personal 
interest in providing that investigation. Whether an overworked public 
defender or a lawyer taking a court appointed case with a capped fee, 
any time dedicated to an investigation is not in the attorney’s financial 
interests.59 And if the attorney fails to undertake an investigation and 
the client is harmed, the attorney is unlikely to suffer any adverse 
consequences (such as malpractice liability).60 In summary: if the lawyer 
investigates, it is not beneficial to her personally and if she fails to 
investigate, there is little to fear. Thus, the attorney’s interests in doing 
little to nothing conflict with the indigent client’s interests in counsel 
conducting an investigation. 
But most indigent criminal defense attorneys do not engage in a 
cold calculation not to investigate because it is in their self-interest. 
They believe they are providing a quality representation to their clients, 
even though they are not.61 Eldred draws on research about the dual 
processes of human decision-making: automatic processes (those that 
are “fast, effortless, involuntary . . . and not accessible to 
introspection”) and controlled processes (“slow, effortful, voluntary, 
and accessible to introspection”).62 He explains that an attorney’s self-
interest influences her professional decision-making automatically, and 
this happens before her effortful and slower processes of deliberation 
(about professional conduct obligations) kick in. Eldred concludes: “The 
result is that the automatic preferences for self-interest will often be the 
driving force behind a decision, even when the decision maker believes 
that the choice resulted from an objective evaluation of relevant 
considerations.”63 
When the unconscious influence of self-interest combines with 
situational pressures64 and “the biased way that people tend to seek out 
and interpret information,”65 the indigent criminal defense lawyer may 
reason that entering a plea deal—despite completing no investigation  
58. Id. at 344–47. 
59. Id. at 348–50. 
60. Id. at 350–51. 
61. Id. at 351–52 (concluding that many indigent criminal defense attorneys 
“are likely to believe that they are making calculations in each case based 
on what is best for the client”). 
62. Id. at 360; see also, Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow 20–
24 (2011) (referring to the automatic processes as “System 1” and the 
effortful processes as “System 2”). 
63. Eldred, supra note 55, at 362.  
64. Id. at 352–56 (describing how informal norms, organizational culture, and 
obedience pressure can impact attorney decision-making). 
65. Id. at 362–64. 
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and engaging in no advocacy on the client’s behalf—is in the client’s 
interest. Eldred explains that the indigent criminal defense attorney 
starts from the view that the self-interested option of no investigation 
is justified, and then confirmation bias and motivated reasoning 
influences the attorney to seek out information consistent with this view 
(i.e., evidence of guilt).66 
For precisely the opposite reason, attorney self-interest can 
significantly—but invisibly to the attorneys—influence the poor advice 
they provide their corporate clients contemplating fraudulent conduct. 
Corporate executives like Scott Tucker in the payday loan case, hire 
and consult with attorneys who they hope will help facilitate their 
money-making schemes.67 These corporate advisors have an immediate 
financial incentive to give the corporate client (via that executive) all 
of the zealous-advocacy-within-the-arguable-bounds-of-the-law the 
company can afford. Corporate advisors keep their jobs (as inside or 
outside counsel) when they keep executives happy; they do this by 
finding ways to implement corporate executives’ plans, and not by 
saying no.68 In the payday loan case, Timothy Muir made over $10 
million in advising and assisting the payday loan business through the 
years.69 While other situational pressures and biases (discussed in the 
following parts) also play a role, the corporate lawyer’s self-interest 
plays a role in the attorney failing to provide advice that the actual 
client—the corporation—had an interest in receiving.70 
 
66. Id. at 370. Eldred explains that, in a system in which many attorneys 
start from the premise that their clients are guilty, there is reason to 
believe counsel will unwittingly seek out evidence of the client’s guilt and 
be skeptical of any contrary evidence. Id. at 364, 371–72. 
67. See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and 
Independence, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 29 (2009) (discussing the fact that 
some clients are not seeking legal advice, but rather “legal cover”). 
68. Being fired is such an obvious risk for in-house or outside counsel who do 
not keep executives happy that professional conduct rules give specific 
guidance to attorney who is fired for engaging in up-the-ladder reporting. 
See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(e) (Am. Bar Ass’n 
2017). 
69. Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 3. 
70. Professors Richard Moorhead and Rachel Cahill-O’Callaghan reached the 
same conclusion through their research. Richard Moorhead & Rachel 
Cahill-O’Callaghan, False Friends? Testing Commercial Lawyers on the 
Claim that Zealous Advocacy Is Founded in Benevolence Towards Clients 
Rather than Lawyers’ Personal Interest, 19 Legal Ethics 30 (2016). 
Moorhead and Cahill-O’Callaghan surveyed commercial lawyers (both in 
private practice and in-house) about their values and their “inclinations 
towards zeal” in representing their corporate clients. They determined 
that attorneys more inclined to providing a zealous representation were 
those who were motivated to act in their own interest. Id. 
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In the final analysis, money is a key influence for both groups of 
lawyers, even though neither would identify it as such. Lawyers 
representing indigent criminal defendants provide less zealous advocacy 
because it is not in their financial interest to do so, while corporate 
advisors provide more zealous advocacy because it is in their financial 
interest to do so. In both scenarios, the representation provided is not 
in the client’s interest. The indigent criminal defendant needs more 
advocacy and the corporate client needs more advice about liability and 
less advocacy. 
B. Obedience Pressure 
An attorney’s advice—or lack of advice—about possibly fraudulent 
or criminal conduct will be influenced by the people who surround the 
attorney.71 Obedience research explains the power an authority figure 
has to influence bad advice. In the case of a corporate attorney 
addressing planned conduct that may be criminal or fraudulent, the 
authority figure is likely the corporate executive that the attorney 
reports to in the professional relationship. 
Stanley Milgram’s 1960’s work on obedience was groundbreaking.72 
His purpose was to determine how far a person would go in carrying 
out an authority figure’s instructions, as those instructions came 
increasingly into conflict with the person’s conscience.73 In Milgram’s 
experiment, test subjects were told that they were participating in a 
study concerning punishment’s impact on learning.74 A person in a 
white lab coat (the authority figure) directed the experiment’s subjects 
to flip a switch that would provide an electric shock to a “learner” (who 
was strapped to a chair and connected to an electrode) when the learner 
provided an incorrect answer to a question.75 The subjects were put in 
control of a shock generator that contained thirty switches that ranged 
from 15 volts (marked “Slight Shock”) all the way to 450 volts (two 
switches prior were marked “Danger: Severe Shock” and the final two 
 
71. Eldred, supra note 21, at 766 (explaining “situationism” as the “notion 
that subtle aspects of the situation play a significant role in how decisions 
are reached”). 
72. See, e.g., Jerry M. Burger, Situational Features in Milgram’s Experiment 
That Kept His Participants Shocking, 70 J. Soc’y For Psychol. Study 
Soc. Issues 489, 489 (“For half a century, the findings from Stanley 
Milgram’s obedience studies have been among the most intriguing and 
widely discussed data ever to come out of a psychology lab.”). 
73. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority An Experimental 
View 3 (1974). 
74. Id. Subjects were all men, but were drawn from a variety of backgrounds, 
including postal clerks, salesmen, laborers, and teachers. Id. at 14–16. 
75. Id. at 3. The learner’s task was to memorize a list of word pairs. He would 
receive a shock if he failed to recall the correct pairing. Id. 
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switches were marked XXX.).76 The subject was directed to provide 
shocks of increasing intensity with each incorrect answer.77 Though the 
learner was hidden from the subject’s view, the subject could hear the 
learner’s increasingly loud and emotional grunts and then screams as 
he was shocked after each incorrect answer.78 When the learner pleaded 
for the shocks to stop, the subject would invariably look to the man in 
the white lab coat for direction; that man consistently told the subject 
that the experiment must continue.79 
Milgram described the chief finding of his experiment as the extent 
to which the subjects were willing to act against their conscience and 
defer to the authority figure.80 The experiment revealed that almost 
two-thirds of study participants were willing to shock the learner at the 
direction of the man in the lab coat.81 In post-experiment interviews, 
Milgram found that most subjects did not view themselves as 
responsible for their conduct.82 Subjects explained they would not have 
engaged in this conduct themselves but that they did it because they 
were required to by the authority figure.83 The situation made subjects 
more likely to engage in wrongful conduct: they perceived the man in 
the lab coat and not themselves to be responsible.84 
In subsequent studies, Milgram described the experiment to 
numerous individuals and asked them to predict whether they 
personally would continue the shocks to the end.85 Not a single person 
predicted that he or she would comply with the authority figure all the 
 
76. Id. at 20. 
77. Id. at 3 
78. Id. at 4. 
79. Id. at 4; see also id. at 21 (describing the language the experimenter used 
to prod the subject to continue, such as “[t]he experiment requires that 
you continue” and “[y]ou have no other choice, you must go on”). 
80. “It is the extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any lengths on the 
command of an authority that constitutes the chief finding of the study 
and the fact most urgently demanding explanation.” Id. at 5. 
81. Id. at 5; see also id. at 33 (stating that twenty-six of forty subjects obeyed 
the authority figure, providing shocks to the highest level on the 
generator). 
82. Id. at 7. 
83. Id. at 8. 
84. Burger, supra note 72, at 495–96 (“Milgram created a situation in which 
his participants could easily deny or diffuse responsibility for hurting the 
learner.”). 
85. Milgram, supra note 73, at 27–28. Individuals from three groups were 
asked for their predictions: psychologists, college students, and middle-
class adults of various occupations. 
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way to the highest level.86 They predicted that they would disobey 
because of their sense of justice, empathy, and compassion.87 In another 
survey, Milgram asked Yale psychology students to predict the behavior 
of 100 hypothetical subjects in the study.88 They predicted that between 
0 and 3 percent would shock to the end.89 Obviously, the numbers from 
Milgram’s experiment do not bear out these predictions. The authority 
figure wields a tremendous amount of power over most subjects, calling 
into question the commonly held view that only “bad” people would be 
obedient under such circumstances.90 
This obedience research provides insight into why a corporate 
attorney may fail to advise an authority figure against a fraudulent 
scheme.91 For payday loan attorney Timothy Muir, his authority figure 
was company CEO Scott Tucker.92 Tucker was the person who had 
hired Muir in his first job out of law school and the individual who 
continued to employ Tucker when he started his own law firm.93 So 
while the corporation was Muir’s actual client, Muir would have looked 
to Tucker for direction. Milgram’s findings suggest it would have been 
difficult for Muir to say no to Tucker and advise him against his 
planned conduct. 
C. Conformity Pressure 
A decade before Milgram’s obedience experiments, Solomon Asch 
studied the impact of conformity (or “social pressure”) on human 
behavior.94 In Asch’s experiment, a subject and a group of six to eight 
 
86. Id. at 28 (noting that of 110 respondents, all believed they would disobey 
the authority figure at some point prior to the final switch). 
87. Id. at 30. 
88. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. Abnormal Soc. 
Psychol. 371, 375 (1963). 
89. Id. 
90. Milgram, supra note 73, at 5 (explaining that a commonly offered 
explanation is that only “monsters, the sadistic fringe of society,” would 
inflict a shock at the most severe level). 
91. Other behavioral legal ethics scholars have used Milgram’s obedience 
research to explain wrongful obedience of new attorneys working under 
the direction of a senior attorney. See generally Catherine Gage O’Grady, 
Wrongful Obedience and the Professional Practice of Law, 19 J. L. Bus. 
& Ethics 9 (2013); see also Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by 
Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 451 (2007). 
92. Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 2. 
93. Id. 
94. Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, Sci. Am., Nov. 1955, at 
31 (Nov. 1955). 
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confederates were told to pick which of three lines on one card matched 
the length of a single line on another card.95 The difference between the 
lines was not subtle: the correct answer was always readily apparent.96 
The group was told this was an experiment in visual judgment, but in 
reality, the purpose of the experiment was to determine whether and to 
what extent the subject would follow the group if the group picked the 
obviously wrong answer.97 
As instructed, in the first two rounds, the confederates picked the 
correct matching line, and the experiment’s subject followed suit.98 But 
in most subsequent rounds,99 all of the confederates picked the 
(obviously) wrong line.100 Despite the clear error, the subjects agreed 
with the majority’s wrong answer 36.8 percent of the time.101 In a video 
of a modern recreation of Asch’s experiment, the subjects’ facial 
expressions reveal obvious discomfort as they choose whether to pick 
the wrong line in order to conform to the group.102 
In interviewing the subjects after the experiment, Asch was 
interested in understanding the reasons some subjects never conformed 
to the group’s wrong answer, while others consistently deferred to the 
majority.103 Many of the subjects who acted independent of the majority 
explained that they did not feel pressured by the group because they 
were confident in their own judgment.104 For the conformists, many 
explained their conduct by stating that they had decided that the 
majority must be right.105 Others stated that they followed the group 
because they did not want to ruin the results of (what they believed to 
 
95. Id. at 32. 
96. Id. (providing example of what the subjects were shown); see also id. at 
32–33 (stating that in ordinary circumstances, an individual matching the 
lines would make a mistake less than 1 percent of the time). 
97. Id. at 32. 
98. Id. 
99. The confederates unanimously pick the incorrect answer in twelve of 
eighteen rounds. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 33. 
102. The video shows the subjects’ facial expressions in response to the experiment 
beginning two minutes into the video. Follow the Leader, YouTube, (July 
23, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ME4lOsQzcIE [https:// 
perma.cc/NC92-QHVB] (showing the video originally created by Dateline 
NBC in 1997). 
103. Asch, supra note 94, at 33. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
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be) the experiment.106 Asch found most unsettling that some of the 
conformists admitted that they followed the majority to hide what they 
perceived as a defect in themselves.107 
Subsequent iterations of Asch’s experiment revealed that even a 
small number of confederates unanimously picking the wrong answer 
influenced the subject.108 If the size of the confederate group was three 
or larger, the subjects conformed at a similar rate.109 
Asch’s research should be particularly concerning for lawyers. For 
Asch’s subjects, the stakes were low—the subjects likely did not know 
the other participants in the study and had no ongoing relationship 
with them.110 Further, the right answer was black and white, and they 
still felt pressured to choose the wrong answer selected by the 
majority.111 For a corporate lawyer addressing possibly fraudulent or 
criminal conduct, the group (with whom she feels pressure to conform) 
might be fellow attorneys or other decision makers at the corporation. 
When handling the corporate client’s lucrative but possibly fraudulent 
plan, the lawyer’s interest in pleasing the group is higher than that of 
Asch’s subjects. Further, for the corporate advisor, more ambiguity 
surrounds which answer is “right.” This ambiguity makes it even easier 
for the lawyer to justify picking the majority’s preferred answer. 
In an interview following his conviction, Timothy Muir discussed 
the conformity pressure he faced, as a recent law school graduate, when 
he began working for Scott Tucker’s payday loan company.112 Muir 
explained, “There was no job description when I started [in 2006, as a 
2004 law school graduate]. I joined a very large legal team that [Tucker] 
had retained through the years.”113 In defending his role in a letter to  
106. Id. Asch described another group of the conformists as “suspect[ing] that 
the majority were ‘sheep’ following the first responder or that the majority 
were victims of an optical illusion.” Asch concluded: “Nevertheless, these 
suspicions failed to free them at the moment of decision.” Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 34. 
109. Id. (explaining that when a single individual answered incorrectly, it had 
little impact on the subject; when two confederates answered incorrectly, 
the subjects conformed 13.6 percent of the time; when the confederate 
group expanded to three, conformity jumped to 31.8 percent; further 
increases in group size did not have a significant impact on conformance 
of the subject). 
110. Id. at 32 (explaining that the participants in the experiment were male 
college students from three institutions of higher learning). 
111. In Asch’s words, the subject “finds himself unexpectedly in a minority of 
one, opposed by a unanimous and arbitrary majority with respect to a 
clear and simple fact.” Id. 
112. Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
113. Id. at 2. 
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the Kansas City Business Journal, Muir “profess[ed] that he simply 
followed the lead of other attorneys before him and operated in good 
faith that his actions met the legal standard.”114 While Muir does not 
use the words “conformity pressure,” the description he provides 
matches Asch’s findings.115 Because all of the other attorneys agreed 
that the client’s conduct was legal, he simply followed the lead of the 
group. 
D. Partisan Bias 
Partisanship can detract from a person’s ability to objectively judge 
the facts. Anyone who has ever watched a football game with a fan of 
the other team understands partisan bias: a person’s alliance causes him 
to perceive and interpret facts (such as the justness of a penalty) in a 
way that favors his team.116 It is difficult for a fan to be objective.117 
And while it is easy to see that lack of objectivity in a fan for the other 
team, it can be close to impossible to see it in yourself. 
Partisan bias—and other biases—impact how people filter and 
interpret information.118 A person’s partisanship influences a person to 
give attention to facts that are favorable to his preexisting beliefs.119 
Thereafter, partisan bias influences how that information—that was 
noticed as most relevant—is interpreted.120 In the final analysis, two 
people can observe the same facts but because of their partisan views 
they will pay attention to different facts as most important and 
interpret those facts favorably to their partisan position. 
The impact of partisanship on lawyers’ interpretation of 
information is readily apparent in experiments focusing on lawyers (and 
law students). The research reveals that partisanship makes it difficult 
 
114. Id. at 3. 
115. See Asch, supra note 94, at 34 (noting that “[w]hen consensus comes under 
the dominance of conformity, the social process is polluted and the 
individual at the same time surrenders the powers on which his 
functioning as a feeling and thinking being depends”). 
116. Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 
49 J. Abnormal Soc. Psychol. 129, 129–30 (1954) (describing an 
experiment in which fans of Dartmouth and Princeton were asked to 
watch footage of a football game between their teams and count the rule 
violations of each team, rate each flagrant or mild, and judge which team 
started the rough play). 
117. Id. at 130–32 (describing the stark differences between how each group of 
fans interpreted the rule violations and rough play in the game). 
118. Robertson, supra note 67, at 6–10. 
119. Id. at 7–8. 
120. Id. at 9. 
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for a lawyer to filter and interpret information objectively.121 One study 
found that law students who participated in a moot court competition 
overwhelmingly perceived that their assigned side had the better case.122 
In another study, subjects were asked to play the role of attorney for 
plaintiff or defendant in determining the settlement value of a case.123 
Even though both sides received identical information, those who were 
randomly assigned to play the plaintiff predicted an award substantially 
higher than that predicted by the defendant.124 In a study involving 
lawyers making predictions about the value of their cases, researchers 
compared attorney predictions with actual outcomes.125 The research 
revealed that lawyers, regardless of years of legal experience, were 
overconfident in their predictions.126 
It is worth noting that partisan bias can be a powerful, positive tool 
for a lawyer. Take the example of a litigator. If partisan bias cements 
her firm belief in her client’s interpretation of the facts, then she may 
become a better advocate in the courtroom. Not being able to see the 
possibility that the opponent is right may make it easier to point out 
to the jury all of the flaws in the opponent’s position. Of course, such 
partisanship makes it difficult for the litigator to advise the client of 
the weaknesses in its case or to provide a neutral assessment of whether 
the client should settle.127 But on the whole, there is undoubtedly a 
benefit in the litigator’s partisan bias. 
For the corporate advisor, though, partisan bias can make it more 
difficult for him to do his job. It is essential that the advisor be able to 
make a judgment about the prospect of liability for a planned course of 
conduct in order to competently advise a client. If the corporate 
advisor’s bias inhibits her ability to recognize the risk of liability, she 
 
121. Id. at 10. 
122. Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listoken, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype 
and Should They? A Natural Experiment, 41 J. of Legal Stud., 239, 
239–42 (2012). 
123. Robertson, supra note 67, at 8 (citing George Loewenstein et al., Self-
Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. Legal 
Stud. 135, 145–46 (1993)). 
124. Id. at 8.  
125. Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability 
to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 133, 133 
(2010). 
126. Id. at 144. 
127. Robertson, supra note 67, at 8–9 (explaining that partisan bias research 
reveals that lawyers with identical information place significantly different 
values on their clients’ cases, which means these lawyers will provide 
misleading and unhelpful settlement advice to their clients). 
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will be less likely to provide the client the advice it needs.128 While the 
lawyer’s partisanship and loyalty are owed to the corporation and not 
company executives,129 the evidence—research and anecdotal—reflects 
that corporate advisors play the role of partisan of company executives 
who want a proposed course of conduct to be legal.130 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the advisor’s partisan bias problem is 
different from the zealous advocacy problem discussed earlier.131 Even 
the lawyer who properly views her role as an advisor responsible for 
protecting the client from serious liability will find it difficult to 
recognize the risk that conduct may be fraudulent or criminal because 
of partisan bias.132 
While it is impossible to know the impact of partisan bias on 
Timothy Muir’s advice, the hallmarks of it are present in his case. When 
Muir discussed his conduct with a reporter after his conviction, he still 
did not recognize that he had engaged in illegal conduct.133 The reporter 
described Muir as believing “he was wrongly convicted.”134 Muir 
insisted: “All of my [payday loan] clients, and myself, believed 
wholeheartedly in the legality of their business model.”135 If Muir is to 
be believed, partisan bias could explain why he was unable recognize 
an alternate interpretation of the facts—that the payday loan 
companies were engaged in fraudulent conduct. If partisanship blinded 
him to that possibility, it would have been impossible for him to provide 
the advice his clients needed in order to avoid liability. 
 
128. See supra Part III. 
129. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2018) 
(explaining that the organization is the client). 
130. This partisanship favoring executives is undoubtedly a product of other 
topics discussed in this Article: attorney self-interest and obedience 
pressure. Suggestions for how advisors could be guided in re-
conceptualizing partisanship and the corporate client’s interests are 
discussed in Part III. See supra Part III.  
131. See supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text. 
132. See Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 1, 3. Of course, for the advisor who views 
her role as a zealous advocate, she has a double burden of bias and zeal 
that weighs against her ability to make an independent judgment that the 
client should be dissuaded of engaging in a course of conduct that is likely 
fraudulent or criminal. See id.; supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text. 
133. Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 1, 3. 
134. Id. at 1. 
135. Id. at 3. 
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III. Influencing Better Corporate Legal Advice 
through the Lessons of Behavioral Legal Ethics 
Understanding that a variety of factors influence a corporate 
advisor’s conscious and unconscious thought processes, where are the 
“pressure points” at which a change might result in improved advising? 
Drawing on law and behavioral science, this Part suggests that 
attorneys might be influenced to better protect their corporate clients 
through introducing additional authority figures, priming, education, 
and changes in attorney consequences for those who fail to protect their 
corporate clients. This discussion considers which of the various 
stakeholders—corporations, rule makers, and the attorneys 
themselves—is in the best position to leverage our knowledge of 
attorneys’ motivation and thought process. 
A. Interventions to Combat a Corporate Attorney’s Wrongful Obedience 
and Conformity 
Both Milgram and Asch identified a similar situational factor that 
can reduce wrongful obedience and conformity. They found that the 
introduction of additional dissenting voices—peers in the case of 
conformity or a competing authority figure in the case of obedience—
changed the subject’s behavior.136 
In one of numerous variations on Milgram’s original experiment, 
the subject (the individual tasked with shocking the “learner”) was 
given competing instructions from two authority figures—each in a lab 
coat and each apparently playing a similar role in conducting the 
experiment.137 When the learner loudly protested at the 150-volt level, 
the experimenters provided the subject with contradictory 
commands.138 One told him that he must continue the experiment, while 
the other told the subject the experiment has to stop.139 Of twenty 
subjects, eighteen immediately ended the experiment, one ended the 
experiment at the following volt level, and one had already stopped 
 
136. Milgram, supra note 73 at 105–07; Asch, supra note 94, at 34. 
137. Milgram, supra note 73 at 105–06 (explaining that the two 
“experimenters” alternated reciting instructions, were seated behind a 
control table, and actively recorded the responses). Id. at 107–08 
(describing the efforts made to equalize the experimenters’ apparent 
authority). 
138. Id. at 105–06. 
139. Id. at 106 (explaining that the experimenters directed their remarks not 
to one another but to the subject; a transcript of the exchange starts with 
one stating, “[w]e’ll have to stop,” which was followed by the other 
experimenter responding, “[t]he experiment requires that we go on. Please 
continue, teacher.”). 
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prior to the disagreement between the experimenters.140 Milgram noted 
that some subjects spent time trying to determine, unsuccessfully, 
which of the two experimenters was the boss.141 Based on the results of 
this variation on the basic experiment, Milgram concluded that because 
there was not a “higher” authority to follow, the subject was unable to 
proceed.142 
Asch also introduced dissenting voices into later iterations of his 
experiment.143 Recall in Asch’s original experiment, the subject was 
faced with defying the unanimous crowd if he were to pick the correct 
answer to the line matching problem.144 In a subsequent twist, Asch 
introduced one individual into the group who chose the right answer.145 
Even though the vast majority still selected the wrong line, the 
additional individual did not and that helped the subject ignore the 
majority and pick the correct line.146 
To an extent, attorney professional conduct rules are constructed 
to take advantage of some of Milgram’s and Asch’s lessons about 
additional voices’ impact on authority and conformity. First, on the 
topic of conformity, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(4) 
allows an attorney to reveal confidential information to secure legal 
advice about compliance with his professional conduct obligations.147 
Thus, an attorney is allowed to seek another dissenting voice that might 
embolden her to defy the group. Of course, like Asch’s subjects, the 
attorney must recognize that the group is (or may be) wrong before the 
attorney would take this step of seeking another opinion. 
Second, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(b) attempts to 
interpose competing authorities, making it easier for the corporation’s 
attorney to defer to someone who wants to stop the criminal or 
fraudulent conduct.148 One of the problems with the current rule is that 
it is so complex and ambiguous it may be difficult for attorneys to  
140. Id. at 107. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 111 (explaining that within an authority system, when there are 
contradictory commands, the subject determines who is in charge and 
follows that person’s direction, and if that is not possible, “action cannot 
proceed.” In other words, Milgram did not conclude that the subject 
followed the direction that he preferred, but rather that the subject 
stopped because there was not a higher authority to follow). 
143. Asch, supra note 94, at 34. 
144. Id. at 32. 
145. Id. at 34. 
146. Id. (noting that subjects answered incorrectly only one fourth as often 
under this variation as against the unanimous and wrong majority). 
147. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6(b)(4) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017). 
148. Id. r. 1.13(b). 
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understand that the goal is protecting the client. The following 
discussion on priming addresses these issues and suggests some edits to 
Rule 1.13(b) that will clarify the attorney’s role. 
B. Priming Corporate Advisors to Protect the Corporation from Liability 
Research on priming reveals the powerful influence that words (and 
images, ideas, gestures, and more) can have on human behavior—all 
outside the conscious awareness of the actor.149 For example, if a person 
reads the word “eat” and is then asked to create a word from the 
fragment “SO_P,” she is more likely to complete the word as “SOUP” 
than “SOAP.”150 She will do the opposite if exposed to the word wash 
before engaging in the completion exercise.151 In his book Thinking, Fast 
and Slow, Daniel Kahneman explains that priming activates associated 
thoughts and ideas, and that this thinking is automatic, silent, and 
hidden from our conscious selves.152 
Priming studies provide fascinating evidence of how even the 
subtlest forms of priming can influence human conduct. Asking subjects 
to look at cartoons while holding a pencil in their mouths will influence 
them to think the cartoons are more or less funny depending on whether 
the pencil forced a “smile” or a “frown.”153 Voters who cast their ballots 
in schools are more likely to support initiatives seeking funding for 
schools.154 Experiment subjects who are exposed to words that evoke 
images of the elderly—bald, gray, wrinkled, and Florida—are primed 
to think about old age, which in turn primes them to walk more slowly 
when they walk to a new location.155 
Particularly pertinent to the issue of priming attorneys, a number 
of studies reveal the impact of priming on ethical decision-making. For 
example, office coffee drinkers are more likely to contribute to the office 
coffee fund when photos of eyes are placed above the coffee maker than 
when photos of flowers adorned the wall.156 Less cheating occurs when 
students are primed to think about (and affirm a commitment to) 
 
149. Kahneman, supra note 62, at 52–58. 
150. Id. at 52. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 50–52. 
153. Id. at 54 (unknown to the subject of the experiment, the pencil forces a 
“frown” when the eraser end is held in the mouth and a “smile” when the 
pencil is held in the middle with the eraser to the right and the point to 
the left). 
154. Id. at 55.  
155. Id. at 53. 
156. Id. at 57–58.  
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honesty before completing a task or exam.157 Further, a number of 
studies reveal that priming subjects with money poses a danger to 
ethical decision-making.158 For example, in one experiment subjects who 
were exposed to money-related words were substantially more likely to 
indicate (in a later portion of the experiment) that they would engage 
in unethical behavior in hypothetical scenarios.159 
At least three groups—rule makers, companies, and attorneys—
should consider how priming could (and already does) influence a 
corporate attorney’s advice about seemingly lucrative, but potentially 
criminal, conduct. First, these groups should study the priming that is 
already occurring. For example, if a corporation keeps its stock price 
front and center—whether on the company website, in messaging 
directed to employees, or even (as it was at Enron) displayed in the 
building160—the company and its attorneys should recognize the impact 
that prime may have on legal advice. Attorneys bombarded with 
messages about company finances may be primed to help the 
corporation engage in misconduct that is profitable in the short term.161 
Rulemaking committees should consider the possibility that 
professional conduct rules are already priming attorney behavior. A 
corporate attorney faced with questionable conduct may consult the 
up-the-ladder reporting provision of Rule 1.13.162 In addition to suffering 
from complex and often ambiguous language,163 the rule references the 
company’s “best interests” and prompts the attorney to consider 
whether conduct is “likely to result in substantial injury” to the 
organization.164 Even though the goal is encouraging attorneys to take 
concerns of misconduct to higher authorities in the organization, the  
157. Dan Ariely, The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty 41–45 (2012). 
158. Francesca Gino & Cassie Mogilner, Time, Money and Morality, 25 
Psychol. Sci., 414, 414 (2014) (explaining research that reveals that 
when people focus on money, they act in self-interested ways, such as 
cheating); Kahneman, supra note 62 at 55 (providing examples of how 
priming with money “produce[s] some troubling effects”). 
159. Maryam Kouchaki et al., Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to Money Triggers 
a Business Decision Frame and Unethical Outcomes, Organizational 
Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 53, 55 (2013). 
160. Peter Elkind & Bethany McLean, The Smartest Guys in the 
Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (2004). 
161. See generally Kahneman, supra note 62, at 55–56 (describing the effects 
of priming people with money). 
162. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017). 
163. See Eldred, supra note 55, at 378 (“One of the most important factors 
that can accentuate the power of automatic [decision-making] processes is 
ambiguity in controlling rules, which makes it easier for people to 
unconsciously believe that they are acting in a responsible manner.”). 
164. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017). 
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rule may prime attorneys to advocate that questionable conduct is not 
likely to injure and may even be in the best interests of the company.165 
Second, all three audiences should consider how corporate attorneys 
could be primed to provide better advice in the face of planned 
misconduct. But what language should be the prime? A prime that 
suggests lawyers should “protect the corporate client from liability” 
may be a workable option. The language emphasizes the positive 
(attorneys should help their client), the word “protect” likely triggers 
associations of safeguarding the client’s interests, and the language 
provides simple direction that the client should be protected from 
liability. 
Finally, attorneys, corporations, and rule makers should decide how 
to deliver the prime. Attorneys should consider ways to display the 
protect-the-client-from-liability prime in their offices.166 For 
corporations, it may be as important to prime other company decision 
makers as it is to prime attorneys. In that way, everyone working for 
the company may associate avoiding liability as in the corporation’s 
interest. A corporate code of conduct could be an avenue for conveying 
this message.167 For a prime to work, it must be something attorneys 
(and other decision makers) are exposed to at times when it will 
influence advice (and receptiveness to advice).168 This could be achieved 
with a code of conduct card—perhaps the size of a business card—that 
company decision makers are encouraged to carry with them or keep 
within eyesight in their offices. 
Rule makers should consider amending professional conduct rules 
to provide a better prime to corporate attorneys faced with an agent’s 
planned misconduct. As noted above, the current Model Rule 1.13(b) 
is most pertinent—it is the rule that addresses what an organization’s 
attorney should do when faced with potentially liability-creating 
misconduct.169 That rule could be revised as follows to provide corporate 
attorneys with a prime to protect the client from liability: 
If a lawyer for an organization knows learns that an officer, 
employee or other person associated with agent of the 
 
165. This interpretation was not the intent behind these rules but is how they 
have often been interpreted. See Schaefer, supra note 37, at 279–80. 
166. Eldred, supra note 21, at 799–800 (explaining that he provides each 
Professional Responsibility student a quote about ethical decision-making 
that he hopes they will keep in their workspace when they are lawyers). 
167. See, e.g., Deloitte, Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct 
(2016); Allete, Code of Business Conduct (2015); see also Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., Institution Letter on Corporate Codes of Conduct: 
Guidance on Implementing an Effective Ethics Program (Oct. 21, 2005).  
168. Kahneman, supra note 62, at 50–51 (explaining how priming works in a 
“second or two”). 
169. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017). 
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organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act 
in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a 
legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is 
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, or 
planning conduct that may result in liability for the organization 
(or liability of the agent to the organization), then the lawyer 
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the 
organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not 
necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the 
lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the 
organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to 
take action to protect the organization from liability, including 
advising the agent and higher authorities within the highest 
authority that can act on behalf of the organization against the 
conduct as determined by applicable law. 
The revised rule takes the prime front and center: protect the 
organization from liability. While the proposed amendment 
substantially simplifies the language of the rule, it does not change the 
rule’s substance.170At a time when an attorney is most susceptible to 
influence—as he is viewing this rule to create a plan for addressing an 
executive’s possibly ill-advised plan—the prime evokes associations of 
protecting the company, which should influence better advice.171 
C. Educating Lawyers About Debiasing Techniques 
Some have legitimately questioned whether education can 
significantly impact behavior that occurs outside of a person’s conscious 
awareness.172 But providing people with the right kind of education and 
tools can help them recognize and address their biases.173 How the 
education is delivered can make the difference between causing people  
170. Id. 
171. Eldred, supra note 55, at 383–84 (explaining that how a decision is framed 
can reduce, or increase, “the power of conscious, ethical deliberation”). 
172. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 67, at 34–35 (explaining that when 
cognitive biases are “deep seated and unconscious, education is least likely 
to be effective”); Eldred, supra note 55, at 388 (asserting that “biases 
[cannot] be purged simply by educating . . . lawyers about them” and 
citing research for the proposition that “merely calling attention to the 
existence of unconscious biases and asking people to counteract them 
voluntarily rarely changes behavior”). 
173. Joan C. Williams, Double Jeopardy? An Empirical Study with 
Implications for the Debates over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37 
Harv. J.L. & Gender 185, 228 (2014) (explaining that unconscious bias 
does not mean bias that cannot be controlled and explaining the value in 
some contexts of describing bias as “unexamined” rather than 
“unconscious”). 
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to become more entrenched in their biases or open to change. Education 
about the existence of biases will likely be ineffective and maybe even 
counterproductive, particularly when a person’s biases are “deep-seated 
and unconscious.”174 But teaching people productive ways to overcome 
their biases may make a difference.175 
Research suggests that counter-factual thinking is a method that 
can be effective in de-biasing decision-making.176 With this technique, 
the decision maker intentionally takes a position inconsistent with the 
position that the bias would influence him to reach.177 One strategy for 
doing this is considering the “outsider’s perspective” when reaching a 
decision on the issue.178 
For the corporate advisor, the hazard of partisan bias is an inability 
to see why the company’s desired course of conduct may result in 
substantial liability.179 A corporation could address this issue by 
providing training for its attorneys about how counter-factual thinking 
can be used to see the facts from the perspective of a prosecutor or 
plaintiff. What arguments would they make if they were to prosecute 
or file suit based on this decision? In other words, corporate advisors 
need to think about the potential for liability when they encounter a 
potentially profitable new scheme, rather than focusing on evidence 
that confirms the bias that the conduct is acceptable. 
D. Serious Consequences for Attorneys Who Fail to Protect Corporate 
Clients from Crime and Fraud Liability 
Behavioral science suggests that if attorneys were to face serious 
consequences for failing to advise against fraudulent and criminal 
conduct, those consequences would have a positive impact on future 
corporate attorney advice. The “serious consequences” could include 
civil and criminal liability. Civil liability would take the form of 
malpractice liability for the attorney’s failure to act competently and 
loyally to advise against and protect her client from serious forms of 
 
174. Robertson, supra note 67, at 35. 
175. Id. at 34 (citing Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing 
Biased Litigants, 22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 913, 916 (1997)) (noting the 
mixed evidence on the effectiveness of debiasing, but noting that some 
studies have found it effective to educate people about biases and ask 
them to “question their own judgment by explicitly considering 
counteraguments to their own thinking”). 
176. Eldred, supra note 55, at 389. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. (citing Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be 
Improved?, 4 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 379, 381 (2009)). 
179. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. 
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liability.180 Criminal liability would flow from the lawyer’s participation 
in the corporate client’s fraudulent scheme.181 
While the Timothy Muir case is one in which a corporate attorney 
faced serious consequences for his role in a client’s criminal conduct, 
such cases remain rare—and not for a lack of attorney misconduct. The 
in pari delicto doctrine has generally been interpreted to prevent a 
corporate client from pursuing a malpractice claim against an attorney 
who failed to advise against criminal or fraudulent misconduct.182 
Courts should revisit the liberal application of in pari delicto in these 
cases, which effectively insulates corporate attorneys because they failed 
to do their job.183 While there are more criminal prosecutions of 
corporate lawyers today than in recent history, these prosecutions are 
still rare.184 Prosecutors should scrutinize an attorney’s role in a  
180. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48 (Am. 
Law Inst. 2000) (describing a client’s cause of action against an attorney 
for professional negligence).  
181. Id. at § 8 (describing attorney’s liability for criminal acts). 
182. See generally Paula Schaefer, In Pari Delicto Deconstructed: Dismantling 
the Doctrine that Protects the Business Entity’s Lawyer from Malpractice 
Liability, 90 St. John’s L. Rev. 1003 (2016) (arguing that the in pari 
delicto doctrine should not be a complete defense when a corporation 
claims that its lawyer committed malpractice by failing to advise against 
fraudulent or criminal conduct that harmed the company). 
183. Id. at 1062 (explaining that the application of the in pari delicto defense 
to corporate attorneys depends on a great irony in that the facts that 
should trigger liability—that the lawyer failed to act reasonably to stop 
an agent’s misconduct that was aimed at enriching the corporate client—
are the basis for the lawyer’s defense; this is so because agent misconduct 
aimed at enriching the company is imputed to the company and the 
company is barred from suing the lawyer because “it” participated in the 
misconduct). 
184. It is often noted that none of the lawyers who advised Enron faced 
prosecution after the company’s massive accounting fraud became public 
in 2001. Id. at 1049 (first citing Ashby Jones, Where were the Lawyers?, 
Wall St. J. (Jan. 2, 2007, 8:52 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/ 
01/02/where-were-the-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/35YP-Z2RN]; then citing 
Dan Ackman, Enron’s Lawyers: Eyes Wide Shut?, Forbes (Jan. 28, 2002, 
12:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2002/01/28/0128veenron.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3KYQ-MVUW]). In more recent years, though, there have been 
some high-profile criminal prosecutions of corporate lawyers. See, e.g., 
United States v. Newkirk, 684 F. App’x. 95, 96–98 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(affirming conviction of Bryan Cave lawyer Harvey Newkirk for his role 
in his client’s fraud related to the purchase of Maxim magazine and 
holding that the evidence warranted a jury instruction that Newkirk’s 
guilty knowledge could be inferred from facts that supported a finding of 
conscious avoidance); United States v. Collins, 581 F. App’x. 59, 60–61 
(2d Cir. 2014) (affirming conviction of Mayer Brown lawyer Joseph 
Collins for his role in Refco, Inc.’s fraudulent scheme and determining 
conscious avoidance jury instruction was proper). 
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corporation’s fraudulent schemes just as they would consider the 
conduct of any other company executive. 
One reason an increase in liability for attorneys would likely result 
in better advice is that it would prevent ethical fading. Ethical fading 
occurs when a person stops thinking of a decision as one that implicates 
ethical (and in this case, legal) consequences.185 When a decision instead 
is thought of as a business decision or a routine decision that does not 
require ethical (or legal) thinking, the decision may not be approached 
as thoughtfully.186 
An example of how publicity about adverse attorney consequences 
can counter ethical fading and lead to better decision-making was 
evident following the Himmel case. In that case, the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s suspended an attorney for failing to report the unethical 
conduct of another attorney.187 In the year following Himmel’s highly 
publicized suspension, attorney reports of misconduct by fellow 
attorneys—as required by Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 8.3—
increased from 154 to 922.188 Put simply, Himmel’s discipline prevented 
ethical fading: other attorneys could plainly see the ethical issue that 
was implicated by learning of another attorney’s misconduct. 
Similarly, publicity about serious consequences that an attorney has 
suffered for failing to advise against fraudulent and criminal misconduct 
should bring the ethical and legal issue to the forefront of attorneys’ 
minds. Cases like the Muir case—with publicity regarding a corporate 
attorney being convicted and sentenced to years in prison189—make a 
difference to attorneys in a legal community who follow the coverage. 
When there are prominent examples of corporate attorneys doing prison 
time, it makes it difficult for lawyers to lose sight of the implications of 
their actions. In case there was any doubt, Muir closed a letter to one 
reporter with the following: “Last, I have one thing to say: Prison 
sucks.”190 
Further, holding lawyers responsible for their role in corporate 
misconduct addresses one of the situational factors that encourages 
 
185. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-
Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 223, 224–25 (2004). 
186. Id. at 232–33. 
187. In re James H. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988). 
188. Seth Ellis & Jeffrey R. Hanes, The 20 Year Anniversary of Himmel: 
Brushing Up on Your Duty to Report Attorney Misconduct, DCBA, Mar. 
2009, at 16. 
189. There has been a good deal of publicity related to Muir’s prosecution and 
conviction for his role in his client’s criminal scheme. See, e.g., Dornbrook, 
supra note 1; Pete Brush, Atty Tells Jury Tribe Grew Wary of Racer’s 
Payday Loan Plan, Law360 (Sept. 18, 2017, 5:47 PM). 
190. Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 4. 
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wrongful obedience. Individuals are more inclined to be obedient in a 
questionable situation when they feel comfortable that the authority 
figure is ultimately responsible.191 While there are multiple ways that 
laws,192 professional conduct rules,193 and even companies194 might 
encourage lawyers to feel responsible for protecting their corporate 
clients from criminal liability, attorneys’ knowledge that other lawyers 
have faced serious consequences for these failures also provides a 
powerful incentive. Knowing that jail may be the consequence for failing 
to take ownership of the decision is likely to influence attorney advice. 
Finally, serious adverse attorney consequences—in the form of civil 
or criminal liability—would be significant because that would impact 
how attorney self-interest influences an attorney’s advice.195 Today, it 
is easy for an attorney to see her self-interest as aligned with that of 
the company’s decision makers (who want to engage in the arguably 
fraudulent or criminal conduct).196 The attorney can make a good deal 
of money “helping” the company engage in misconduct. If it appears 
there is little or no chance of facing civil or criminal liability for this 
help, there is no incentive for the lawyer to tell corporate decision 
makers the difficult news that they do not want to hear. In contrast, if 
lawyers know that they can face prison time and/or substantial civil 
liability for failing to protect their corporate clients from fraudulent 
conduct, their self-interest is realigned with that of their corporate 
clients. 
 
191. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
192. Burger, supra note 72, at 499 (citing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
requirement that senior executives personally certify the accuracy of 
corporate financials as an example of a law that requires a specific person 
to take responsibility so that they are less likely to defer to others or pass 
blame up or down the corporate hierarchy). 
193. The ABA and SEC’s 2003 adoption of attorney professional conduct rules 
concerning an attorney’s obligation in the face of organizational client 
misconduct was an attempt on the part of both bodies to place clear 
responsibility on attorneys to intervene to prevent corporate crime and 
fraud. See Carl Pierce et al., Professional Responsibility in the 
Life of the Lawyer 596–97 (2d ed, 2015). For reasons discussed in this 
Article, those rules should be revised to clarify the attorney’s 
responsibility to protect the organizational client from such liability. 
194. Burger, supra note 72, at 499 (explaining that in order to lessen wrongful 
obedience, organizations should “implement policies that force individuals 
[to] take responsibility for their actions”). 
195. Eldred, supra note 55, at 388 (explaining that a direct strategy for 
addressing ethical blindness in attorneys is to change the way they 
calculate self-interest). 
196. See supra Part II.D. 
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Conclusion 
The fact that attorney Timothy Muir is in prison today should be 
of concern to corporate attorneys. There is nothing in the facts of his 
case that suggests that Muir is a “bad person.” He is just an attorney 
who acted in some very predictable ways. It could have happened to 
anyone. 
Muir acted as a zealous advocate of his corporate client’s plans, 
rather than an advisor helping his client avoid liability. He was likely 
influenced by his own self-interest in making money and continuing his 
working relationship with Scott Tucker’s companies. This would have 
made it difficult for Muir to tell Tucker what he did not want to hear. 
It is likely that Muir felt obedience and conformity pressure to help the 
company continue with business-as-usual, despite the fact that there 
were warning signs. Finally, his bias as a partisan for the company 
undoubtedly colored his view of the facts, making it difficult to see the 
civil and criminal liability that was likely. 
Behavioral legal ethics reveals the causes of the flaws in Muir’s 
thinking. The field also suggests the tools attorneys, corporations, and 
rule makers could use to change corporate attorney behavior that is 
potentially harmful to clients. Obedience and conformity research 
reveals that competing opinions can result in better decision-making, 
while priming studies teach us that strategically placed words can have 
a positive impact on attorney behavior. Research on de-biasing 
demonstrates that attorneys can learn to overcome (or at least lessen) 
their biases so they will be more likely to reach an independent 
professional judgment. And while it is certainly not a popular solution, 
if more corporate attorneys faced serious consequences for facilitating 
fraudulent and criminal conduct, that would have a positive impact on 
the self-interest and obedience “calculations” of other attorneys 
navigating these issues. 
The list of possible solutions provided in this Article is just a 
starting point. Relying upon behavioral legal ethics, that list can be 
expanded upon by creative stakeholders interested in the goal of 
attorneys providing better advice to their corporate clients. 
 
